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Atelier CIREQ-CIRANO en économie de l’environnement et des ressources naturelles


vendredi 12 jan 2024
De 9H à 12H


Cet atelier sur l’économie des ressources naturelles et de l’environnement accueillera Éric Bahel, professeur au département d’économie de Virginia Tech, qui présentera « Anonymous and Strategy-Proof Voting under Subjective Expected Utility Preferences ». La seconde conférencière sera Dana Ghandour, étudiante au doctorat à Concordia University, qui présentera « Environmental Cooperation and Trade – The Impact of Heterogeneity in Environmental Damages: An Endogenous Solution ».


  • Éric Bahel (Virginia Tech)
    « Anonymous and Strategy-Proof Voting under Subjective Expected Utility Preferences »
    We study three axioms in the model of constrained social choice under
    uncertainty where (i) agents have subjective expected utility preferences over
    acts and (ii) different states of nature have (possibly) different sets of available
    outcomes. Anonymity says that agents’ names or labels should never
    play a role in the mechanism used to select the social act. Strategy-proofness
    requires that reporting one’s true preferences be a (weakly) dominant strategy
    for each agent in the associated direct revelation game. Range unanimity
    essentially says that a feasible act must be selected by society whenever it
    is reported as every voter’s favorite act within the range of the mechanism.
    We first show that every social choice function satisfying these three axioms
    can be factored as a product of voting rules that are either constant
    or binary (always yielding one of two pre-specified outcomes in each state).
    We describe four basic types of binary factors: three of these types are
    novel to this literature and exploit the voters’ subjective beliefs. Our characterization
    result then states that a social choice function is anonymous,
    strategy-proof and range-unanimous if and only if every binary factor (in its
    canonical factorization) is of one of these four basic types.


  • Dana Ghandour (Concordia University)
    « Environmental Cooperation and Trade – The Impact of Heterogeneity in Environmental Damages: An Endogenous Solution »
    This paper utilizes a three-country static model of environmental cooperation with trade to analyze
    the stability of partial and global International Environmental Agreements (IEAs) among
    environmentally heterogeneous countries. Strong incentives to free ride and challenges in
    enforcing international environmental agreements make international cooperation a difficult task.
    In the context of international trade, governments face a tradeoff between enforcing higher taxes
    to cooperatively reduce emissions and paying higher tariffs on exports when acting
    noncooperatively. Diamantoudi et al. (2018a) demonstrated that stable coalitions among
    homogeneous countries are larger and provide significant welfare gains compared to the basic
    model without trade.
    The paper’s objectives, therefore, are: (i) To determine whether environmental cooperation among
    heterogeneous countries provides environmental gains, overall welfare gains, or both, (ii) To
    identify which cooperative scenarios will emerge in a stable environmental coalition to exploit
    these gains, and (iii) To capture the effect of heterogeneity in environmental damages on the
    stability of these environmental coalitions. Cooperation entails that countries belonging to the
    same coalition choose the same emissions tax rate and common import tariffs .
    In the proposed model, each country has a single firm producing an emission-intensive
    homogeneous good, which results in an equal number of transboundary emissions such as carbon
    dioxide. The game is a three-stage static coalition formation game solved by backward induction.
    In stage one, each country chooses its coalition membership. A coalition is deemed stable if no
    firm has an incentive to either enter or exit the coalition (D’Aspremont et al., 1983). In stage two,
    each country determines the optimal emissions tax and import tariff rates that maximize the
    coalition’s welfare. In stage three, each firm chooses non-cooperatively its profit-maximizing
    production level. Firms compete à la Cournot in a segmented market with positive endogenous
    import tariffs rather than in a free trade setting.
    The main findings demonstrate that the grand coalition is stable at varying levels of environmental
    damage heterogeneity. When market sizes are sufficiently small, the grand coalition leads to both
    environmental and overall welfare gains. However, as market sizes grow sufficiently larger, the
    grand coalition only yields overall welfare gains.


Cet événement se tiendra en anglais.

Bahel, Éric
Professeur, Virginia Tech
Ghandour, Dana
Étudiante (Ph.D.), Concordia University


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