

Discussion: Strategic Abuse and Accuser
Credibility
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WESC&P 2018

Motivation and Summary

- How are unverifiable reports of abuse generated and handled?
 - ▶ Timely topic.
 - ▶ Striking result: if the principal is highly career-concerned, then incentives for good behaviour collapse when a second agent is added to the relationship.

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- Justified (*) and baseless (**) complainants weigh intensity of preferences for successful removal against cost:

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- With a single agent, $Q^* = Q^{**} = Q$ are exogenous.
 - ▶ Relative preference intensity is unrelated to informativeness ($\omega^{**} = \omega^* - b$).
 - ▶ As $Q \rightarrow 0$, no abuse and arbitrarily informative reports.

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- With multiple agents, Q^* and Q^{**} are endogenous.
 - ▶ When abuses are isolated, connection between J and B is bad for informativeness.
 - ▶ Informative complaints require: optimistic beliefs for B ($Q^{**} > Q^*$) and intense preferences for J.
 - ▶ As $Q^*, Q^{**} \rightarrow 0$, relative preference intensity is independent of abuse disutility b and these are incompatible.
 - ▶ Uninformative reports increases abuse.
 - ▶ When abuses are generalised, J are more optimistic and have relatively less intense preferences: reports are informative.

Comments

- Benchmark: evaluator commitment.
 - ▶ Not unrealistic in a world of formalised HR policies.
 - ▶ The loss from lack of commitment seems qualitatively worse with multiple agents.
 - ▶ With multiple agents and no commitment high punishment L is bad. Reversed with commitment?

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- Seemingly unethical findings of guilt: evaluator waits for two reports but knows that one of them is baseless.
 - ▶ In monotone equilibria, more reports increase posterior for guilt.
 - ▶ Any gain possible from non-monotone equilibria?
 - ▶ Again, robust to commitment?
 - ▶ “Saints” and “bad apples”. What about “bullies”?

Comments

- Distribution of agents' preferences for the principal.
 - ▶ Effect of “polarisation” in agents' opinions?
 - ▶ Could thicker tails help reduce crime with multiple agents?
 - ▶ Normal distribution? Is anything other than log-concave + tail condition needed?

Comments

- Distribution of agents' preferences for the principal.
 - ▶ Effect of “polarisation” in agents' opinions?
 - ▶ Could thicker tails help reduce crime with multiple agents?
 - ▶ Normal distribution? Is anything other than log-concave + tail condition needed?
- More broadly, it seems like the final version of the paper would benefit a lot from engaging with (certainly extensive?) policy discussions about firms' internal practices.
 - ▶ How should evidence be handled? Results are robust to to exogenous verification, but suggestions for effective use of evidence as policy tool?
 - ▶ Efforts to separate/insulate claims of abuse?
 - ▶ Discussion of pressure on “socially acceptable” threshold π^* ? Irrelevant for crime rate with single-agent but not with multiple agents.