Fiscal Surprises at the FOMC¹

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Dean Croushore, Simon van Norden

Fiscal Surprises at the FOMC

Fiscal Surprises at the FOMC

Dean Croushore, Simon van Norden

ntroduction

The Data Set

Forecast Bias and Efficiency Bias Efficiency

Forecast Accuracy

Two Puzzles The Great Moderation Puzzle The Turing Point Puzzle

Conclusions

CIRANO, April 2018 1 / 23

Outline

Introduction

- 2 The Data Set
- 3 Forecast Bias and Efficiency
 - Bias
 - Efficiency

4 Forecast Accuracy

5 Two Puzzles

- The Great Moderation Puzzle
- The Turing Point Puzzle

Conclusions

Fiscal Surprises at the FOMC

Dean Croushore, Simon van Norden

Introduction

The Data Set

Forecast Bias and Efficiency Bias Efficiency

Forecast Accuracy

Two Puzzles The Great Moderation Puzzle The Turing Point Puzzle

Conclusions

< 47 ▶

A B M A B M

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Introduction

This paper is a companion to Croushore and van Norden (REStat 2017)

- Same data set: Greenbook Fiscal Forecasts (August 1967 to December 2010)
- We hand-collected and cleaned multiple series
- Download it from svannorden.org

The REStat paper argued that the forecasts were interesting because expected fiscal policy mattered for the formulation of monetary policy.

This paper looks at the qualities of those fiscal forecasts in greater detail.

Fiscal Surprises at the FOMC

Dean Croushore, Simon van Norden

Introduction

The Data Set

Forecast Bias and Efficiency Bias Efficiency

Forecast Accuracy

Two Puzzles The Great Moderation Puzzle The Turing Point Puzzle

Conclusions

▲ 4 ···

A B M A B M

Croushore and van Norden 2017

"Fiscal Forecasts at the FOMC: Evidence from the Greenbooks"

- Presents narrative evidence (from press releases, congressional testimony, etc.) from the 1960s to 2010s showing that the Board consistently claims to adjust monetary policy to take into account expected fiscal policy.
 - The 2013 Sequestration debate illustrated this vividly.
- Provide the second s
- Examines correlations of fiscal forecast errors with those of other variables.
- Repeats Romer and Romer (2003) estimation of monetary policy shocks, but now including expected fiscal policy.

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Dean Croushore, Simon van Norden

Introduction

The Data Set

Forecast Bias and Efficiency Bias Efficiency


Forecast Accuracy

Two Puzzles The Great Moderation Puzzle The Turing Point Puzzle

Conclusions

< □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ >

Croushore and van Norden 2017



Dean Croushore, Simon van Norden

Fiscal Surprises at the FOMC

CIRANO, April 2018 5 / 23

Fiscal Surprises at the FOMC

Dean Croushore, Simon van Norden

Introduction

The Data Set

Forecast Bias and Efficiency Bias Efficiency

Forecast Accuracy

Two Puzzles The Great Moderation Puzzle The Turing Point Puzzle

Conclusions

Why is This Data Set Interesting?

- Expertise: non-partisan, unconstrained by unrealistic assumptions, by largest team of US macroeconomic forecasters whose forecasts of inflation, GDP, unemployment compare to the very best available.
- Peal-Time: true forecasts, updated 2x per quarter
- Breadth: it covers fiscal forecasts over six complete business cycles and several fiscal policy regimes, covering both peacetime and several wars.
- Pertinent: the forecasts were precisely those presented to monetary policymakers
- Actual & Cyclically-adjusted surplus forecasts

Available from my web page at svannorden.org

Fiscal Surprises at the FOMC

Dean Croushore, Simon van Norden

Introduction

The Data Set

Forecast Bias and Efficiency Bias Efficiency

Forecast Accuracy

Two Puzzles The Great Moderation Puzzle The Turing Point Puzzle

Conclusions

< □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ >

Summary of Results

What do we find in our second paper?

- We present expanded bias and efficiency analysis
 There is little bias and the forecasts look pretty efficient.
- Oespite that, forecast errors can sometimes be big, even at relatively short forecast horizons.
- While the accuracy of unemployment rate forecast errors improved after 1990, that of most fiscal variables deteriorated considerably.
- Cyclically-adjusted-deficit forecasts appear to be over-optimistic around both business cycle peaks and troughs.

Fiscal Surprises at the FOMC

Dean Croushore, Simon van Norden

Introduction

The Data Set

Forecast Bias and Efficiency Bias Efficiency

Forecast Accuracy

Two Puzzles The Great Moderation Puzzle The Turing Point Puzzle

Conclusions

A B M A B M

FOMC Greenbook Forecasts I

Board Staff Projections

- FOMC meetings from August 1967 to Dec. 2010
- Use first & last meeting of each quarter
- Five-year embargo

Macroeconomic and Fiscal forecasts

- Nominal and real GDP (GNP before 1992)
- Unemployment rate
- Surplus/Deficit
- Receipts
- Expenditures
- High-Employment Budget Surplus (HEB & HEB6)

Fiscal variables converted to nominal GDP shares

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Dean Croushore, Simon van Norden

Introduction

The Data Set

Forecast Bias and Efficiency Bias Efficiency


Forecast Accuracy

Two Puzzles The Great Moderation Puzzle The Turing Point Puzzle

Conclusions

< □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ >

FOMC Greenbook Forecasts II




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the FOMC

FOMC Greenbook Forecasts III




Fiscal Surprises at the FOMC

CIRANO, April 2018 10 / 23

Fiscal Surprises at

the FOMC

FOMC Greenbook Forecasts IV



Fiscal Surprises at the FOMC

Dean Croushore, Simon van Norden

ntroduction

The Data Set

Forecast Bias and Efficiency Bias Efficiency

orecast Accuracy

I wo Puzzles The Great Moderation Puzzle The Turing Point Puzzle

Conclusions

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FOMC Greenbook Forecasts V

We constructed forecast errors several ways, taking account of data revisions.

- First Release
- 1 Year
- Last Greenbook
- Pre-Benchmark
- Current Vintage

Most of the results we present use Pre-Benchmark

- Civilian Unemployment Rate is Current Vintage
- HEB and HEB6 is Last Greenbook

Fiscal Surprises at the FOMC

Dean Croushore, Simon van Norden

ntroduction

The Data Set

Forecast Bias and Efficiency Bias Efficiency

Forecast Accuracy

Two Puzzles The Great Moderation Puzzle The Turing Point Puzzle

Conclusions

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Testing for Forecast Bias

We do extensive testing for forecast bias.

- tests at each forecast horizon
- joint tests across forecast horizons
- tests for zero mean (or median) error
- tests using alternative outcome measures (Last, Initial, 1 Yr., Pre-Benchmark)
- full sample and split-samples

There is little evidence of bias, with the following exceptions

- Forecast errors have non-zero **medians** in several cases (esp. Unemployment)
- Nowcasts sometimes appear to be biased
- Long Horizon (> 4Q) forecasts of the Surplus tend to be overoptimistic by 1.0-1.5% of GDP on average
- HEB (and HEB6) forecasts were overoptimistic pre-1990 (but not the Surplus!)

Fiscal Surprises at the FOMC

Dean Croushore, Simon van Norden

Introduction

The Data Set

Forecast Bias and Efficiency Bias Efficiency

Forecast Accuracy

Two Puzzles The Great Moderation Puzzle The Turing Point Puzzle

13 / 23

Conclusions

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Bias Tests: p-Values I

	Sur	plus	Expen	ditures	Re	eceipts			
Horizon	First	Last	First	Last	First	Last			
			1974Q4 to 1992Q4						
0	0.13	0.23	< 0.01***	< 0.01***	0.12	< 0.01***			
1	0.62	0.65	0.22	0.16	0.42	0.36			
2	0.88	0.98	0.69	0.56	0.33	0.37			
3	0.48	0.59	0.95	0.85	0.18	0.18			
4	0.31	0.35	0.86	0.96	0.04**	0.07*			
1-4	0.76	0.68	0.94	0.92	0.19	0.35			
	1993Q1 to 2010Q4								
	Surplus		Expen	ditures	Re	Receipts			
Horizon	First	Last	First	Last	First	Last			
0	0.47	0.17	0.38	0.15	0.95	0.95			
1	0.63	0.79	0.54	0.47	0.97	0.67			
2	0.32	0.32	0.39	0.42	0.38	0.38			
3	0.24	0.29	0.43	0.51	0.18	0.22			
4	0.25	0.26	0.47	0.51	0.16	0.16			
1-4	0.32	0.31	0.47	0.46	0.28	0.27			

Fiscal Surprises at the FOMC

Dean Croushore, Simon van Norden

ntroduction

The Data Set

Forecast Bias and Efficiency Bias

Forecast Accuracy

Two Puzzles The Great Moderation Puzzle The Turing Point Puzzle

Conclusions

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CIRANO, April 2018

Bias Tests: p-Values II

	HE	ΞB	HE	HEB6					
Horizon	First	Last	First	Last	First	Last			
		1974Q4 to 1992Q4							
0	< 0.01***	< 0.01***	0.01**	0.05**	0.06*	0.05*			
1	< 0.01***	< 0.01***	< 0.01***	0.02**	0.23	0.09*			
2	< 0.01***	< 0.01***	< 0.01***	< 0.01***	0.47	0.34			
3	< 0.01***	< 0.01***	< 0.01***	< 0.01***	0.69	0.57			
4	< 0.01***	< 0.01***	< 0.01***	< 0.01***	0.64	0.59			
1-4	< 0.01***	< 0.01***	< 0.01***	< 0.01***	0.39	0.31			
	1993Q1 to 2010Q4								
0	0.43	0.21	0.43	0.21	0.07	0.77			
1	0.49	0.72	0.49	0.72	0.33	0.20			
2	0.28	0.33	0.28	0.33	0.79	0.62			
3	0.17	0.23	0.17	0.23	0.99	0.84			
4	0.15	0.16	0.15	0.16	0.91	0.98			
1-4	0.29	0.31	0.29	0.31	0.92	0.82			

Fiscal Surprises at the FOMC

Dean Croushore, Simon van Norden

ntroduction

The Data Set

Forecast Bias and Efficiency Bias Efficiency

Forecast Accuracy

Two Puzzles The Great Moderation Puzzle The Turing Point Puzzle

Conclusions

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CIRANO, April 2018

2

Forecast Performance and Encompassing Tests

Variable	Surplus		Receipts		Expenditures			
Horizon (Years)	0	1	0	1	0	1		
RMSFE - Greenbook	0.0086	0.0141	0.0049	0.0103	0.0052	0.0088		
RMSFE - CBO	0.0092	0.0171	0.0067	0.0121	0.0058	0.0107		
RMSFE - Random Walk	0.0110	0.0178	0.0068	0.0128	0.0064	0.0091		
Greenbook versus CBO								
H ₀ : Equal Quadratic Loss	0.726	0.251	0.031	0.034	0.342	0.142		
<i>H</i> ₀ : Equal Absolute Loss	0.578	0.221	0.020	0.156	0.671	0.333		
<i>H</i> ₀ : GB encompasses CBO	0.465	0.378	0.800	0.099	0.564	0.375		
H_0 : CBO encompasses GB	0.252	0.185	0.003	0.015	0.017	0.071		
Greenbook versus Random Walk								
<i>H</i> ₀ : Equal Quadratic Loss	0.337	0.136	0.124	0.121	0.140	0.872		
<i>H</i> ₀ : Equal Absolute Loss	0.203	0.163	0.073	0.096	0.189	0.851		
H ₀ : GB encompasses RW	0.328	0.552	0.900	0.211	0.514	0.552		
H_0 : RW encompasses GB	0.076	0.052	0.042	0.079	0.026	0.139		

RMSFE indicates the Root-Mean-Squared Forecast Error. Figures shown for hypothesis tests are p-values. **Boldface** denotes *p*-values < 5%. Fiscal Surprises at the FOMC

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
Introduction

The Data Set Forecast Bias and Efficiency Bias Efficiency Forecast Accuracy Two Puzzles The Great Moderation Puzzle

Conclusions

Relative Forecast Accuracy

MSFE / Variance of Outcomes



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Fiscal Surprises at the FOMC

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CIRANO, April 2018 17 / 23


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Forecast Error Distribution



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CIRANO, April 2018 18 / 23

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The Great Moderation Puzzle

Forecast Error Variances (relative to unconditional variance 1967Q3–2010Q4.)

Horizon	Expenditures	Receipts	Surplus	HEB	HEB6	Unemployment		
1967Q3–1990Q4								
0F	0.073	0.106	0.078	0.166	0.089	0.027		
1F	0.141	0.198	0.177	0.230	0.085	0.080		
2F	0.192	0.291	0.246	0.276	0.068	0.151		
3F	0.275	0.292	0.303	0.310	0.088	0.236		
4F	0.340	0.330	0.332	0.406	0.084	0.299		
5F	0.323	0.125	0.141	0.498	0.229	0.330		
6F	0.342	0.099	0.164	0.868	0.326	0.377		
1991Q1-2010Q4								
0F	0.061	0.108	0.053	0.131	0.178	0.009		
1F	0.074	0.196	0.096	0.201	0.271	0.024		
2F	0.156	0.409	0.212	0.336	0.454	0.042		
3F	0.276	0.597	0.357	0.487	0.659	0.078		
4F	0.435	0.818	0.545	0.692	0.936	0.122		
5F	0.613	1.007	0.726	0.894	1.209	0.158		
6F	0.790	1.063	0.808	1.030	1.393	0.196		

Fiscal Surprises at the FOMC

Dean Croushore, Simon van Norden

ntroduction

he Data Set

Forecast Bias and Efficiency Bias Efficiency


Forecast Accuracy

Two Puzzles

The Great Moderation Puzzle The Turing Point Puzzle

Conclusions

The Turing Point Puzzle Business Cycle Peaks



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CIRANO, April 2018

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
20 / 23

Fiscal Surprises at

the FOMC

Dean Croushore, Simon van Norden

The Turing Point Puzzle **Business Cycle Troughs**



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Dean Croushore, Simon van Norden

Introduction

The Turing Point

Dean Croushore, Simon van Norden

Fiscal Surprises at the FOMC

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CIRANO, April 2018

э

The Turing Point Puzzle

We think this is new, in part because we cover more business cycles than other fiscal forecast datasets.

This is **not** your standard Turning Point bias!

- Size of errors much larger than the mean forecast bias
- HEB should exclude variations due to cyclical variation in unemployment (i.e. through "automatic stabilizers")
- Positive errors after Peaks (i.e. in downturns) are consistent with **discretionary** fiscal stimulus.
- But so soon? and after troughs?

Has fiscal policy usually been more counter-cyclical and discretionary than we thought? Or does the Board Staff revise the relationship between unemployment and the deficit after every downturn? Fiscal Surprises at the FOMC

Dean Croushore, Simon van Norden

Introduction

The Data Set

Forecast Bias and Efficiency Bias Efficiency

Forecast Accuracy

Two Puzzles The Great Moderation Puzzle The Turing Point Puzzle

Conclusions

A B < A B </p>

Conclusions

What did we learn?

- There is little bias and the forecasts look pretty efficient.
- But forecast errors can sometimes be big (even at shorter horizons.)
- Siscal forecast accuracy deteriorated greatly after 1990.
- Cyclically-adjusted-deficit forecasts have been too optimistic around both business cycle peaks and troughs.

Open questions:

How does accuracy compare to other forecasts, countries?

What does it imply for the conduct of fiscal policy?

- e How did fiscal policy change after 1990? Did we see similar drops in accuracy in other countries?
- What explains the bias around turning points? Discretionary policy? Revisions in "structural" relationships?

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Dean Croushore, Simon van Norden

ntroduction

The Data Set

Forecast Bias and Efficiency Bias Efficiency

Forecast Accuracy

Two Puzzles The Great Moderation Puzzle The Turing Point Puzzle

Conclusions